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Reputation Protection on Online Rating Sites 
 
Anne SY Cheung 
Wolfgang Schulz 
 
Introduction 
One of the most significant changes effected by the Internet is the making of 
information and comments on individuals readily available for viewing by any and all. 
This enhanced transparency has created a new business model, and led to the 
flourishing of rating, evaluation and even blacklisting sites.
1
 For example, teachers, 
lawyers and doctors are now openly rated by their students,
2
 clients
3
 and patients.
4
 
Yet, such evaluations are not confined to the job performance arena. For instance, 
Open Table is a site that allows customers and restaurant owners alike to identify 
customers who are likely to turn up late for their bookings;
5
 Rottenneighbors.com 
allows residents to locate unfriendly neighbors; and DontDateHimGirls.com affords 
                                                     
1 
In this article, rating sites refer to online platforms that score and rank individuals or businesses. 
Evaluation sites provide an opportunity for users to post comments on individuals and businesses, in 
addition to ranking and scoring them. Sacha Pfeiffer, Ratings Sites Flourish behind a Veil of Anonymity, 
THE BOSTON GLOBE (2006), available at 
http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2006/09/20/ratings_sites_flourish_behind_a_veil_
of_anonymity/ (last visited Jun. 8, 2017).  
2
 RATE MY PROFESSORS - REVIEW TEACHERS AND PROFESSORS, SCHOOL REVIEWS, COLLEGE CAMPUS 
RATINGS, http://www.ratemyprofessors.com/. French case of NotetoBe, Cour d’appel de Paris 14ème 
chambre, section A Arrêt du 25 juin 2008, Note2be.com(2008), available at 
http://www.legalis.net/spip.php?page=jurisprudence-decision&id_article=2349. German case of 
Spickmich, Spickmich.de, BGH 23.06.2009, VI ZR 196/08, (German Federal Supreme Court).  
3
 The Law Society & Ors v. Kordowski, [2011] EWHC 3185 (Q.B.). Davis v. Avvo, NO. 
C11-1571RSM, 2012 WL 1067640 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 28, 2012). 
4
 Braverman v. Yelp, Inc., 115629/12 (Jun. 28, 2013) 
5
 Katie Hafner, Restaurant Reservations Go Online, THE NEW YORK TIMES, Jun. 18 2007. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3037399 
 2 
women a platform on which to out terrible boyfriends.
6
 In the words of Lori 
Strahlevitz, we are now living in a “reputation nation,”7 wherein various aspects of 
our conduct are evaluated by often anonymous individuals, ushering in the danger of 
shame sanctions. Unfair evaluations or personal information taken out of context can 
lead to misjudgments and misunderstandings, causing potentially serious harm.
8
 
Moreover, they can also exert a negative impact on communities as a whole when 
they rely on models of biased, unfair and incorrect information for judging others.       
 Although reputation rating sites are far from being a system of formal 
adjudication, their power can hardly be ignored, especially when evaluations are 
related to work performance. These sites often post false or incorrect information, and 
many do not allow individuals to correct such information. Victims in common law 
jurisdictions may rely on defamation law, but will find themselves helpless against 
anonymous individuals expressing their opinions online.
9
 Equally, victims in 
continental law jurisdictions will not necessarily fare any better under privacy law if 
the information is considered of legitimate public interest and is already in the public 
                                                     
6
 Todd Hollis v. Cunningham, 1:2007CV23112 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 29, 2007). 
7
 Lori J. Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW. 1667 (2008). 
8
 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, Speech, Privacy and Reputation on the Internet, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET: 
SPEECH, PRIVACY, AND REPUTATION 15 (Saul Levmore & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2010).  
9
 Sophie Kay, COMBATTING ANONYMOUS ONLINE DEFAMATION CONFLICTS (2016), 
https://inforrm.wordpress.com/2016/11/05/combatting-anonymous-online-defamation-conflicts-sophie-
kay/. RonNell Andersen Jones & Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Of Reasonable Readers and Unreasonable 
Speakers: Libel Law in a Networked World, VA. J. SOC. POLICY LAW 155 (2016). 
 3 
domain.
10
 Furthermore, litigation is lengthy, costly and plagued with uncertainty. In 
the absence of satisfactory legal solutions and remedies, some have resorted to 
alternative methods of “reputation management.”11 For example, doctors have been 
reported to ask patients to sign waiver forms declining to participate in online rating 
forums before providing consultations,
12
 and a number of companies have been 
established to help those who have been rated unfavorably to rebuild and “amplify 
their reputation.”13  
Formal and informal norms are gradually emerging to moderate the battle 
between evaluation and reputation protection, but they remain in a fledgling state and 
are not without problems. As explained later in the article, reputation is an inherently 
social and relational concept that “serves an important signaling function” about an 
individual’s place within society.14 At the same time, it also reflects the rules of 
civility within the community: how we manage reputation information to make it 
reliable and how we draw boundaries between the private and the public. We 
                                                     
10
 See judgments before the European Court of Human Rights. Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) 
40660/08 [2012] ECHR 228. Von Hannover v. Germany (no.3) 87712/10 [2013] ECHR 264. The 
judgment is in French, and the official press release in English. European Court of Human Rights Press 
Release. “German Courts’ Decisions Respected Private and Family Life of Princess Caroline von 
Hannover.” 19 September 2013, https://rm.coe.int/168067d217  . 
11
 Eric Goldman, The Regulation of Reputational Information, THE NEXT DIGITAL DECADE: ESSAYS ON 
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 293 (2010). 
12
 MEDICAL JUSTICE, AVOID BEING DEFAMED ON THE WEB: HAVE YOU GOOGLED YOUR NAME 
LATELY? available at: 
https://medicaljustice.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/ANTI_DEF_-_MJ_Report.pdf 
13
 Examples of companies that offer services claiming to rescue individuals’ online reputations include 
Reputation Defenders, https://www.reputationdefender.com/reputation (Last visited Aug. 1, 2017), and 
EMERIT - ONLINE REPUTATION MANAGEMENT FOR DOCTORS, https://emerit.biz/ (last visited Aug. 1, 
2017). 
14
 David S. Ardia, Reputation in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social Foundations of Defamation 
Law, 45 HARV. CR.-CL. REV. 261, 262 (2010). 
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therefore argue herein that what is preferable for protecting online platform reputation 
is a legal framework that is responsive to the changing set of practices ushered in by 
the Internet and can resolve conflicts in a fair and satisfactory way. Drawing on U.S. 
and German jurisprudence on online evaluation platforms, the article advocates for a 
new regime requiring such platforms to formulate an appropriate information policy 
providing transparency rules, including the outlining of how aggregate evaluations are 
made and catering for the right to respond, among other requirements, to achieve a 
new body of communication “netiquette” for social evaluation in the online era. These 
two jurisdictions were chosen because of the popularity of online rating sites in both, 
as well as the existence of a number of relevant judicial decisions on the subject 
matter of interest. The concern in this article is the protection of individual reputation 
rather than those of a business or company. The terms “evaluation sites” and “rating 
sites,” and “online sites” and “online platforms” are used interchangeably throughout 
the article.
15
 
Part I of the article looks at the concept of reputation as interpreted in U.S. 
common law jurisprudence and the German continental law tradition. Under common 
                                                     
15
 The distinction between evaluation and rating sites is explained in supra note 1. A website is 
generally understood to be a web page hosted on a Web server by the site’s owner, a hosting provider 
or an Internet service provider. PC Magazine Encyclopedia at 
https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/54397/website (last visited Aug. 21, 2017). An online 
marketplace refers to a virtual space in which one party can get in touch with another, such as buyers 
and sellers. PC Magazine Encyclopedia at 
https://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/68953/online-platform (last visited Aug. 21, 2017). As we 
will see from the discussion in Part II, the U.S. courts use “online sites” to refer to evaluation sites, 
whereas the German courts generally prefer “platforms.” 
 5 
law, reputation is largely protected through defamation law, the fundamental concern 
of which is to protect an individual’s representation to the world and the world’s 
social construction of his or her identity. German law, in contrast, recognizes the 
protection of a person’s reputation through personality and dignity rights.16  In 
addition to protecting against unwarranted reputational harm and unjustified social 
condemnation, German law also protects individuals’ private sphere.17 An overview 
of the two legal systems affords a better understand of how reputation is protected 
within embedded systems of social and legal norms. Part II then examines the uphill 
legal battle that plaintiffs in the U.S. and Germany must wage in the courts against 
allegedly untrue or misleading comments on online rating platforms. Drawing on the 
lessons learnt from the two jurisdictions, Part III then argues that we need a new 
governance regime that allows for the fair play of reputation protection and freedom 
of expression, taking into account the right to respond and the filtering of incorrect 
information. Only in this way can we better coordinate legal and social norms, and 
ultimately decide what kind of online evaluation platforms are reliable and thus 
deserving of social recognition and legal protection. 
 
                                                     
16
 GRUNDGESETZ FÜ R DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 
23, 1949 BGBl. I, art. 1(1) & art. 2(1). For an English translation, see BASIC LAW FOR THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0019. 
17
 Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in German and American 
Constitutional Law, UTAH LAW REV. 963 (1997). 
 6 
I. The Concept of Reputation : What’s in a Name? 
A well-known verse in the Bible avers that “a good name is more desirable than 
great riches; to be esteemed is better than silver or gold.”18 Indeed, there is much 
truth in the saying that “good reputation [is] painstakingly earned, easily lost and not 
readily rebuilt.”19 The protection of reputation from unjustified attack has thus long 
been a common concern of both the common law and continental law traditions. In 
this part of the article, we discuss the fundamental rationale for the protection of 
reputation, be it under defamation law or with reference to personality rights, and 
redraw its socio-legal boundary with freedom of expression in the arena of online 
rating platforms. In the process, we demonstrate the interconnection of social norms 
and legal rules and the need for a coherent response. 
 
A. U.S. Common Law Tradition 
Common law has a long tradition of protecting reputation through defamation 
law.
20
 English and U.S. defamation law had much in common until 1964, when the 
U.S. Supreme Court handed down its judgment in US Times v. Sullivan,
21
 which set a 
different legal standard for public—as opposed to private—figures bringing 
                                                     
18
 The Bible, Proverbs 22:1. 
19
 David A. Anderson, Reputation, Compensation and Proof, 25 WILLIAM & MARY LR. 747, 777 
(1984). 
20
 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION 118 (2007) 
21
 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 7 
defamation actions.
22
 Although U.S. defamation law varies from state to state, the 
core elements of liability for defamation are (1) a false and defamatory statement 
concerning another; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault 
amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) either 
actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special 
harm caused by the publication.
23
 Consistent with the English common law tradition, 
U.S. defamation law protects against the publication of false rumors about a person 
that “exposes [the] person to hatred, ridicule, contempt or obloquy, or cause[s] him to 
be shunned and avoided.”24 A defamatory statement is one that would generally tend 
to lower the plaintiff in the estimation of right-thinking members of society.
25
 In this 
understanding, a person’s reputation is largely dependent on his or her estimation in 
the minds of third parties. However, the exact definition of reputation remains obscure 
despite a long line of defamation cases.
26
  
Thus, it is necessary for us to go back in time to examine the goals of reputation 
protection. In his seminal piece on the socio-historical and legal study of defamation 
                                                     
22
 “Under the Sullivan test, plaintiffs who are public officials or public figure has to prove the 
defendant has published the defamatory statement with actual malice, i.e. the defendant published the 
statement knowing it to be false, or with reckless disregard as to its falsity.” (quoting New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).) Under English defamation law, no such distinction is 
made. See discussion in ANDREW T. KENYON, DEFAMATION: COMPARATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 240–
241 (2006). 
23
 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 558 (Am. Law Inst. 1977). 
24
 Youssoupoff v. MGM Pictures Ltd., 50 TLR 581 at 587 (C.A.). Id., § 559. 
25
 Sim v. Stretch, [1936] 2 All ER 1237 at 1240 (H.L.). Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 23, 
§ 559. 
26
 Eric Barendt, What is the Point of Libel Law?, 52 CURR. LEG. PROBL. 110–125 (1999). 
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law, Robert Post identifies reputation as property, honor and dignity.
27
 According to 
Post, reputation as property refers to “reputation in the marketplace.”28 An individual 
can earn recognition and build up his or her reputation by “the exertion of talent” or 
“mechanical skill and ingenuity,”29 namely, through skill, labor and effort. An apt 
illustration is professional reputation.
30
 The law of defamation is designed to ensure 
that a person’s reputation is “not wrongfully deprived of its proper market value.”31 
At the same time, Post also considers reputation to be a form of honor owing to 
the venerable tradition of social rank or position conferred upon individuals since the 
times of feudalism and the aristocracy.
32
 Different from reputation as property, 
reputation as honor cannot be earned through effort or labor. It is a reflection of the 
status that society ascribes to one’s social position or specifically defined social role. 
A loss of honor is thus a loss of status and personal identity,
33
 the restoration of which 
can only be “vindicated.”34 For Post, this fact explains the underlying rationale for 
criminal libel and seditious libel in English law.
35
 
                                                     
27
 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 
CALIF. LAW REV. 691, 692 (1986). For analysis of his piece, see Barendt, supra note 26. DAVID ROLPH, 
REPUTATION, CELEBRITY AND DEFAMATION LAW 87–168 (2008). 
28
 Post, id. at 693. 
29
 Id. at 694. 
30
 Post also cites the example of building up a reputation through “a course of virtuous and honorable 
action[s].” Id. at 694–695. 
31
 Id. at 695. 
32
 Id. at 701–702. 
33
 Id. at 691, 703.  
34
 Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 
CALIF. LAW REV. 691, 703 (1986). 
35
 Id. at 702–703. 
 9 
Lastly, Post points out that reputation is also linked to the concept of dignity, by 
which he is referring to the “essential dignity and worth of every human being – a 
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.”36 We earlier noted Post’s 
emphasis on the social and public nature of reputation, being bestowed by others and 
concerning the esteem in which one is held by the community. Here, however, Post 
highlights the “person’s private personality” as his (or her) “essential dignity.”37 
Aware of the apparent paradox, Post reconciles it by drawing on the work of Ervin 
Goffman, specifically the famous sociologist’s work on the symbolic interaction 
tradition.
38
 Our identity and sense of who we are, in Goffman’s view, are constantly 
being molded through social interactions with others.
39
 Each of us is both a subject 
and object at the same time.
40
 Applying this conceptualization, Post suggests that our 
own sense of intrinsic worth is “perpetually dependent upon the ceremonial 
observation by those around us.”41 The law of defamation functions as norms of 
“deference and demeanor,”42 as well as “rules of civility” that members of society 
owe to one another to protect the internal aspect of individual personality and 
                                                     
36
 Id. at 707. Post is quoting Justice Stewart’s dictum in Rosenblatt v Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966). 
37
 Id. at 708. 
38
 Id. at 709–712. ERVING GOFFMAN, INTERACTION RITUAL 84-85 (1967). 
39
 Id. at 709. 
40
 Thomas Gibbons, Personality Rights: The Limits of Personal Accountability, 3 YEARB. OF MEDIA 
AND ENTERTAIN. LAW 53, 58 (1998). Gibbons discusses Post’s article and its relation with Goffman’s 
work.  
41
 Post, supra note 27 at 711.  
42
 Post, supra note 34 at 709. 
 10 
individuals’ intrinsic self-worth.43 From this perspective, reputation has both a private 
and public dimension. It protects the private sphere, the internal aspect of an 
individual’s interest in his or her own dignity as a person, while at the same time 
being concerned with the public sphere, particularly society’s interest in maintaining 
its own rules of decency and governing how members conduct themselves in the 
exercise of speech.  
The three foregoing characteristics of reputation are not mutually exclusive, and 
none is entirely satisfying on its own, and yet they throw light on different aspects of 
defamation law. The unifying feature among them is the “dependence of an 
individual’s reputation on the recognition of others.” 44  Reputation is thus 
indisputably an inherently relational,
45
 and a distinctly social concept. 
 
B. German Law 
The link between an individual and the community is prominent in German 
law, under which there are different ways of protecting a person’s reputation. 
Defamation in itself is primarily a misdemeanor governed under sections 186-189 
                                                     
43
 Id. at 710. 
44
 DAVID ROLPH, REPUTATION, CELEBRITY AND DEFAMATION LAW 3 (2008). Rolph discusses Post’s 
work. 
45
 Id. at 37. 
 11 
of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, StGB).46 In private conflicts, what in fact 
corresponds to the tort of defamation under English or U.S. common law would be 
recognized as the right of personality (allgemeines Persoenlichkeitsrecht), which is 
protected under section 823(1) of the Civil Code (Buergeliches Gesetzbuch, 
BGB),
47
 and article 2(1) of the German Constitution or Basic Law (Grundgesetz). 
The latter guarantees the right to free development of one’s personality. However, 
the interpretation of personality rights protected under article 2(1) of that section 
must be read in conjunction with article 1(1) of the Basic Law which protects the 
right to human dignity.
48
  
Interestingly, the Civil Code contains no reference to the term “personality.” 
Section 823(1) protects specific interests against intentional and negligent invasion, 
stating:  
A person who, intentionally or negligently, unlawfully injures the life, body, 
health, freedom, property or another right of another person is liable to make 
                                                     
46
 BASIL S. MARKESINIS & HANNES UNBERATH, THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS: A COMPARATIVE 
TREATISE 27 (2002). Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) (German Criminal Code). For an English translation, see 
GERMAN CRIMINAL CODE, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/. 
47
 RAYMOND YOUNGS, ENGLISH FRENCH & GERMAN COMPARATIVE LAW 436 (3d ed. 2014). BGHZ 39, 
124 (127). BVERFGE 97, 391 (403). BGHZ 198, 346 ff. Murswiek, in: Michael Sachs (Ed), 
Grundgesetz-Kommentar, Munich 2016, Art. 2, marginal no. 67 et seq. 
48
 BVerfGE 34, 238 ff; 35, 202 ff. Rudolf Streinz, The Role of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court Law and Politics, 31 RITSUMEIKAN LR. 95 (2014), (104). THOMAS HOEREN & ANSELM 
RODENHAUSEN, Constitutional Rights and New Technologies in Germany, in CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 137 (138 et seq) (Ronald Leenes, Bert-Jaan Koops 
& Paul D. Hert et al. eds., 2008). Article 1 of the German Constitution stipulates that “(1) Human 
dignity shall be inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority.” Article 2 
stipulates that (1) Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he 
does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral law. BASIC 
LAW FOR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/ (last 
visited Jun. 8, 2017). 
 12 
compensation to the other party for the damage arising from this [emphasis 
added].
49
 
The absence of the term “personality right” is largely due to historical 
developments. Different from most other continental law jurisdictions, Germany 
never adopted the term “personality,” which is rooted in the Roman legal concept 
of delict injuria.
50
 Although well-recognized in Roman law to protect a person’s 
dignity from injuries to reputation and feelings,
51
 personality rights were 
deliberately left out when the Civil Code was drafted in 1900. General opinion at 
the time held that it was repugnant to compensate such an important intangible 
interest in financial terms.
52
 However, sentiments changed dramatically after the 
Second World War, in light of the defeated Nazi regime’s ruthless trampling of any 
respect for human life, liberty or dignity.
53
 Not only does the German Constitution 
of 1949 expressly protect the dignity of man as inviolable under article 1(1), but it 
also stipulates under article 2 that “everyone shall have the right to the free 
development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or 
                                                     
49
 GERMAN CIVIL CODE, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/(last visited Aug. 3, 2017) 
50
 P. R. Handford, Moral Damage in Germany, 4 INT. COMP. LAW Q. 849, 851 (1978). 
51
 Id. at 851. 
52
 Id. at 855. BASIL S MARKESINIS & HANNES UNBERATH, THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS: A 
COMPARATIVE TREATISE 74 (2002). 
53
 Thomas Gibbons, Personality Rights: The Limits of Personal Accountability, YEARB. MEDIA 
ENTERTAIN. LAW 53, 56 (1997). 
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offend against the constitutional order or the moral law,”54 and the German courts 
have since adopted an expansive approach to the interpretation of BG section 823.  
In 1954, for example, the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof 
BGH) declared in Schacht that the defendant, a newspaper, had violated “a general 
right of personality” under articles 1(1) and 2(1) of the Basic Law.55 The case 
concerned a letter written to the newspaper by Schacht’s lawyer, the plaintiff, 
demanding that certain statements about Schacht be corrected.
56
 The interesting 
background to the case is that Schacht had served as Germany’s Economics 
Minister under Hitler.
57
 Instead of issuing the correction requested, the newspaper 
published the letter with other materials giving the misleading impression that 
Schacht’s lawyer had taken a personal stance in the matter.58 The German Federal 
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, denouncing the defendant for 
infringing the plaintiff’s right of personality, as protected under the Basic Law, by 
publishing the materials in such a misleading manner,
59
 and ordered a correction.
60
 
The significance of Schacht is that from that point onwards, the right of personality 
                                                     
54
 Basic Law For The Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 48. 
55
 BGHZ 13, 334. For discussion of the case, see Handford, supra note 50 at 859. For a case summary 
and English translation of the case, see MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 52 at 412–415. 
56
 MARKESINIS AND UNBERATH, supra note 52 at 413. 
57
 Handford, supra note 50 at 858. 
58
 MARKESINIS AND UNBERATH, supra note 52 at 412–413. 
59
 Id. at 415. 
60
 Id. at 415. 
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has been firmly recognized in Germany as an enforceable right rather than as an 
abstract ideal in the Constitution. 
Another significant case was the 1958 decision in which the Federal Supreme 
Court held that the general right of personality should be recognized as one of the 
“other rights” under section 823(1) of the Civil Code, thereby confirming the direct 
connection between the Civil Code and the Basic Law in the right’s protection.61 
Soon after, the Federal Supreme Court awarded compensation for violation of the 
right of personality based on the Civil Code and the Basic Law in Herrenreiter.
62
 
The plaintiff in that case was a successful amateur show-jumper, and the defendant 
was a pharmaceutical company specializing in the manufacture of a sexual potency 
enhancement drug.
63
 In one of its promotional posters, the defendant had featured 
a picture of a show-jumper based on the plaintiff’s photograph.64 The plaintiff was 
understandably offended, as permission had never been sought, and sued for 
damages.
65
 The Federal Supreme Court ruled that his right of personality had been 
infringed under section 823(1) of the Civil Code and articles 1 and 2 of the Basic 
Law.
66
  
                                                     
61
 BGHZ 24, 72. The case concerns the unlawful release of an insured person’s medical records. 
Handford, supra note 50 at 859. see MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 52 at 473. 
62
 BGHZ 26, 349. For a case summary and English translation of the case, see MARKESINIS & 
UNBERATH, supra note 52 at 415–420. 
63
 MARKESINIS AND UNBERATH, supra note 52 at 415. 
64
 Id. 
65
 Id. 
66
 Id. at 416. 
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It is the Court’s analysis of the meaning of “personality right” that provides 
insight for our discussion. Most importantly, the Court affirmed that the combined 
effect of the dignity and personality rights enshrined in the Basic Law recognizes 
human personalities as “supra-legal basic values” of the law.67 The two rights 
protect the “inner realm of the personality,” which provides the basis for the free 
and responsible self-determination of an individual.
68
 Any invasion of that realm 
must be compensated. A right of personality is characterized as the “inner 
freedom”69 to have interests and make one’s own decisions in the individual 
sphere. 
The emphasis on protection of the personal sphere and analysis on its meaning 
were further elaborated in later cases.
70
 In essence, the personal sphere embraces 
(1) the individual sphere preserving personal individuality in one’s relationship 
with the wider world, particularly in one’s public sphere of influence; (2) the 
private sphere, which includes an individual’s family and private life; and (3) the 
intimate or secret sphere, which refers to an individual’s inner thoughts and feelings 
                                                     
67
 MARKESINIS AND UNBERATH, supra note 50 at 418. 
68
 MARKESINIS AND UNBERATH, supra note 52. 
69
 MARKESINIS AND UNBERATH, supra note 50. 
70
 Handford, supra note 50 at 860. Edward J. Eberle, Human Dignity, Privacy, and Personality in 
German and American Constitutional Law, UTAH LAW REV. 963, 979 (1997). 
 16 
and their external forms.
71
 Thus, the personal sphere carves out the necessary 
space to determine who one is and how one should relate to the world.
72
  
Readers may already have noticed the differences between the common law 
and German legal approaches to the protection of reputation. Common law protects 
reputation through defamation law, and the aim is to protect a person’s name 
against wrongful or untrue social appraisals by others. The German law on 
personality rights, in contrast, protects an individual’s name to allow him or her to 
expressively develop his or her whole being within different societal contexts.
73
 
The law of personality sets the boundaries of when and within what limits personal 
life circumstances may be revealed or how a person may be criticized. Although 
that law bears a close resemblance to the right to be left alone in U.S. privacy law,
74
 
and to Post’s analysis of reputation as dignity (protecting a person’s sense of 
intrinsic worth and society’s rules of civility),75 the scope of the multifaceted 
personality right goes well beyond the common law understanding.  
The case law established by the Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG) illustrates the additional dimensions of the 
                                                     
71
 Handford, supra note 50 at 860. 
72
 Eberle, supra note 17 at 980. 
73
 Wolfgang Schulz & Max V. Grafenstein, The Right to be Forgotten in Data Protection Law: A 
Search for the Concept of Protection, INT. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW AND POLICY 5, 249-269 (2015). 
74
 Referring to the famous phrase of Warren and Brandeis in advocating for the recognition of a right 
to privacy in U.S. common law; see Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARV. LAW REV. 193, 195 (1890). 
75
 Post, supra note 34 at 707–708. 
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right of personality, referring to the different interests a person can have that are 
relevant to the protection of his or her reputation.
76
 Because right of personality in 
Germany is based on the combined jurisprudence of articles 1(1) and 2(1) of the 
Basic Law (which cover human dignity and the free development of personality, 
respectively),
77
 it is also important to consider the Federal Constitutional Court’s 
interpretation of human dignity under article 1 of the Basic Law.  
Closely related to right of personality and dignity is personal honor.
78
 
Different from Post’s analysis of honor as an aristocratic notion in English society, 
honor in German law refers to the respect that each and every person should be 
accorded based on his or her personhood. Accordingly, honor is related to 
protection of the individual sphere.
79
 This embedded element in the right of 
personality means that abusive criticism (Schmähkritik) cannot be tolerated.
80
 
However, owing to the protection of free speech under article 5(1) of the Basic Law, 
only speech that is demeaning without any factual basis is banned.
81
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The right of personality also protects one’s private sphere or privacy.82 This 
includes private and confidential matters including the disclosure of details about a 
person’s sex life or medical condition.83 In addition, the protection extends to a 
spatial area in public where the individual can move and relax, free from continual 
public observation and scrutiny.
84
  
Finally, the fundamental rights dimension of data protection and the right to 
informational self-determination also play a role in consideration of the right of 
personality, as personal data, e.g., one’s name or address, may serve as indicators of 
reputation.
85
 The concept of informational self-determination is formulated by the 
German Constitutional Court in the famous Census Case of 1983.
86
 The Court 
declared certain provisions of the Census Act which mandated the collection of 
comprehensive data of citizens to be intrusive and unconstitutional.
87
 The concern 
was that massive and comprehensive surveys of the population, coupled with 
computing technology, would facilitate the state to control its citizens.
88
 
Informational self-determination is interpreted as “the authority of the individual to 
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decide himself, on the basis of the idea of self-determination, when and within what 
limits information about his private life should be communicated to others.”89  
Rather than distinct categories, the aforementioned rights to honor, private 
sphere, data protection and informational self-determination constitute separate 
aims of protection under the right of personality. German tort law permits claims 
for all three types of interests (see section 823 Civil Code).
90
 There are also 
additional safeguards such as right to one’s own identity,91 special duties for a 
controller of personal data,
92
 as well as clauses on defamation in criminal law 
protecting honor.
93
  
The focus of the discourse on right of personality and reputation in German law 
is on the individual and how he or she relates to others in society. The individual is 
first and foremost a social being. As discussed in the next section, the preservation of 
the personal and private spheres under the right of personality is facing severe 
challenges in the Internet era. An individual’s personal information can be easily 
searched and retrieved, and comments about him or her (including criticism and 
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insults) can be readily posted for all to see  
The way in which reputation is framed is clearly highly dependent on cultural 
and philosophical contexts and the characteristics of the legal system. Because the 
protection of reputation is intertwined with the social norms of the community, the 
challenges for the online community are determining what types of information are 
appropriate for sharing with the public and how information can be shared in a fair 
manner. The legal challenge is to find the delicate balance between an individual’s 
reputation on the one hand and others’ freedom of expression and the public’s right to 
certain personal information on the other.  
 
II. Legal Battle over Online Evaluation Sites 
A. U.S. Law 
As noted at the start of this article, society has long attributed reputation to 
individuals through evaluation, a practice that is being prominently played out on the 
Internet. Subjects of negative evaluations are understandably offended and frustrated. 
If they know the identity of the person who has posted a negative review about them 
on a rating site, they can bring a defamation action against that person, as in McKee v. 
Laurion.
94
 The plaintiff in that case was a physician who unsuccessfully sued a 
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patient’s son for posting negative reviews of the plaintiff on various “rate-your-doctor” 
websites.
95
 However, it is more common for plaintiffs not to know who has posted 
defamatory content, and their only recourse is thus to sue the website operator. As 
explained below, this kind of legal battle has proved to be an uphill one in the U.S. 
The plaintiff in Reit v. Yelp!
96
 was a dentist who sued Yelp! for defamation 
after the company removed all ten positive reviews of the plaintiff’s practice 
following the posting of a single negative comment by an anonymous poster.
97
 Yelp! 
is an interactive online platform that allows the general public to write, post and view 
reviews of a variety of businesses and professionals, including restaurants and other 
service establishments and doctors and dentists.
98
 It also sells and solicits 
advertisements.
99
 The plaintiff alleged that removing positive reviews and 
highlighting negative ones was part of Yelp’s business model and was designed to 
coerce businesses and professionals into paying for advertising on Yelp.com.
100
 
Yelp! claimed that it was immune to defamation liability under the Federal 
Communications Decency Act (CDA)
101
 because it was an Internet computer service 
and not an information content provider.
102
 Section 230(c) of the CDA states that 
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“[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content 
provider.” In addition, under section 230(e), “[n]o cause of action may be brought and 
no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this 
section.” The same law defines an interactive computer service as “any information 
service, system or access software provider that provides or enables computer access 
by multiple users to a computer server,”103 and an information content provider as 
“any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information provided through the Internet or any other information 
computer service.”104 Section 230 of the CDA is often seen as a protector of online 
free speech as it absolves intermediaries of legal liabilities.
105
 
Although the plaintiff in Reit argued that the selective removal of all of his 
positive reviews was more than the exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial 
function, rendering the company an Internet content provider,
106
 the Court ruled 
otherwise. In the Court’s opinion, as long as the allegedly defamatory content was 
supplied by a third party, the defendant’s use of negative posts or reviews in its 
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marketing strategy did not change the nature of the posted data.
107
 Its selection of 
posts constituted an action “quintessentially related to a publisher’s role” and not that 
of a content provider.
108
 
In the cause of action, the plaintiff further alleged that Yelp! engaged in 
deceptive acts and practices in violation of the General Business Law.
109
 For that law 
to offer remedy, however, a plaintiff must prove that the deceptive conduct in question 
must be misleading to a reasonable consumer, and the injury must be an actual 
injury.
110
 Because the plaintiff referred to the text of Yelp’s Business Owner’s Guide 
as the basis for its allegedly deceptive practices, his action failed because the Court 
concluded that the Guide addressed business owners rather than consumers.
111
 
If removing positive comments does not render Yelp! a content provider, what 
about the inclusion of a “Best of Yelp!” page? The plaintiff in Braverman v. Yelp!112 
found himself in the same unenviable position as his counterpart in Reit. Braverman, a 
dentist who discovered that positive comments about his practice had been filtered out 
after the posting of two negative reviews by anonymous posters,
113
 sued for 
defamation, alleging that Yelp! had removed all positive reviews of his practice, failed 
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to investigate any reviews and had never contacted him for comments on the negative 
reviews.
114
 In its defense, Yelp! relied on the CDA in claiming that it could not be 
held liable as the publisher or speaker of the defamatory statement, but Braverman 
argued that, in filtering out reviews, including a list of other dentists in a “Best of Yelp 
list” and charging for advertisements, Yelp! was effectively a content provider.115 
However, the Court disagreed. As in the Reit decision, it ruled that filtering out 
positive reviews written by other content providers (i.e., Yelp! users) was not the same 
as creating or developing content.
116
 Furthermore, the Best of Yelp! list was in a 
separate section from the user reviews, and thus Yelp! still enjoyed immunity as long 
as it was not a content provider for the “portion of the statement” at issue.117 
Likewise, the argument that the Best of Yelp! list was in fact a list of paid advertisers 
was also insufficient to deprive Yelp! of CDA immunity.
118
 
In recognition of the almost insurmountable odds of suing Internet service 
providers under defamation law, the plaintiff in Davis v. Avvo Inc. decided to tread an 
alternative legal path, bring action against the defendant for false advertising, the 
unauthorized use of a likeness for commercial purposes and violations of the Florida 
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Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.
119
 The plaintiff, Davis, was a Florida 
attorney specializing in health law, whereas the defendant was a Seattle-based website 
operator providing the profiles of many lawyers, doctors and dentists in the U.S.
120
 
and listing areas of practice or specialty, disciplinary history, experience, peer 
endorsements, and client or patient reviews.
121
 The lawyer section of the website is 
searchable by area of practice and location.
122
 The information Avvo gathers and 
posts is publicly available material from state bar associations, state courts, and the 
websites of lawyers and firms.
123
 Although a listed attorney is unable to change his 
rating by request, he or she can register on the Avvo website to “claim” his or her 
profile and update the information on his or her work experience, practice areas and 
professional achievements, which may in turn have an impact on his or her rating.
124
 
Davis discovered that not only was he incorrectly listed on the site as an 
employment lawyer, but also that he was the “lowest rated employment lawyer” based 
on a review by a prospective client who had phoned him asking for a discounted legal 
rate.
125
 Adding to his humiliation, Davis found that he was unable to correct his 
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practice area or business address on the Avvo website even after registering.
126
 
As the defendant was a Seattle-based corporation, and pursuant to a forum 
selection clause on the Avvo.com website, the case was heard by the Washington State 
Court, which meant that the defendant was also able to rely on Washington’s 
anti-SLAPP Act (SLAPP stands for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation) 
to strike out the plaintiff’s action.127 The anti-SLAPP Act is intended to address 
lawsuits whose primary purpose is to quash the valid exercise of the constitutional 
right to free speech under the First Amendment and petition for redress.
128
 According 
to the Act, a “party may bring a special motion to strike any claim that is based on an 
action involving public participation.”129 Once a defendant has proved the existence 
of public participation, which is defined as including “any oral statement made … in a 
place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public 
concern” and “other lawful conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional 
right of free speech in connection with an issue of public concern…,”130 the burden 
of proof shifts to the plaintiff, who must demonstrate that there is a substantial case to 
answer.
131
 If the plaintiff fails to meet that standard, the action is struck out. 
In the Court’s opinion in Davis, it was obvious that Avvo.com was a website 
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that involved public participation because it provided information to the general 
public that might be helpful in choosing a doctor, dentist or lawyer.
132
 In addition, it 
allowed members of the public to participate in a public forum by providing reviews 
of individual doctors, dentists or lawyers.
133
 The Court thus concluded that the site 
was a “vehicle for discussion of public issues … distributed to a large and interested 
community.”134 Consequently, the burden of proof shifted to the plaintiff, who had to 
provide clear and convincing evidence that his claim would prevail under Florida law. 
In analyzing the substantive claims of the plaintiff, the Court found that 
because the Washington Consumer Protection Act (WCPA) is substantially similar to 
the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, it would apply the WCPA under 
choice-of-law principles.
135
 To prevail under the WCPA, a plaintiff must prove (1) an 
unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) occurring in trade or commerce, (3) affecting 
the public interest, (4) injury to the plaintiff’s business or property, and (5) 
causation.
136
 In applying the Act, the Court did not consider the rating site to be in 
trade or commerce, as it does not involve “the sale of assets or services” but “collects 
data from public sources … and provides the underlying data and the ratings to 
consumers free of charge.”137 The publication of information and ratings based on 
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publicly available data was not “trade or commerce,”138 it ruled, meaning that the 
alleged misrepresentation of the plaintiff’s area of practice or use of his page did not 
qualify as such.
139
 Furthermore, the plaintiff had not alleged, let alone proved, that he 
had suffered any actual damage or monetary loss,
140
 and the Court therefore struck 
out his motion.  
It is clear that the U.S. courts are not easily moved by the plight of those faced 
with misinformation or incorrect information concerning their professional 
performance posted on rating sites.
141
 Issues of reputation and image simply wither in 
front of the weighty constitutional amendment on free speech and section 230 of the 
CDA.
142
 
 
B. German Law 
The special nature of evaluation platforms and the possible duties of providers 
became apparent in the spickmich.de case decided by the German Federal Court in 
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2009 in which it was asked to rule on the legality of a rating platform.
143
  The 
plaintiff was a teacher who brought a legal challenge against the popular rating 
platform spickmich.de. Since its launch in 2007, more than 1.1 million users had 
registered with the platform, and at the time of the judgment 448,000 teachers had 
been rated, with their names and teaching subjects given.
144
 Teachers were rated in 
accordance with various attributes, including whether they were “cool and funny,” 
“humorous” or “popular.”145 Student users could also post quotations from their 
teachers.
146
  
The plaintiff was a teacher who had received 4.3 out of a total mark of 6, 
which was equivalent to a bare pass in the German system.
147
 She sought a 
prohibitory injunction in a lower court to stop the publication of her personal 
information (i.e., her name, the name of her school, her scores on the website and any 
comments made in class) under the Civil Code,
148
 filed for the deletion of her 
personal data and argued that the platform had infringed her privacy right under the 
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Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, BDSG).
149
 In addition, she 
claimed that the category of “quotations” infringed her right to her own spoken 
words.
150
 Another of the teacher’s arguments was that teachers and users were not on 
equal terms on the site, as, unlike the former, the latter were able to remain 
anonymous because they did not have to provide usernames.
151
 
The spichmich.de case was unique in blurring the boundaries of the different 
objects of protection in the right of personality under the Basic Law. In deciding it, 
the Court did not rely primarily on the general right of personality, but rather on the 
right to informational self-determination, which, on the sub-constitutional level, is 
protected by the Federal Data Protection Act. However, in its balancing it used 
arguments that stem from cases concerning the general right to privacy.  
Under section 29(1) of the Federal Data Protection Act, the commercial 
collection, storage, modification or use of personal data for the purpose of transfer is 
permissible without the consent of the person affected if “there is no reason to believe 
that the data subject has a legitimate interest in excluding such collection, storage or 
modification.”152 The Court interpreted that provision as a test for weighing up the 
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conflicting legitimate interests of the plaintiff and defendant.
153
 On the plaintiff’s side, 
her claim of privacy rested on section 823(1) of Civil Code in conjunction with 
articles 2(1) and 1(1) of the Basic Law, which protect personality and dignity rights, 
respectively.
154
 On the defendant’s side, the right to freedom of expression, which is 
protected under article 5(1) of the Basic Law, was invoked. As discussed earlier, it is 
well established under German law that the right of personality encompasses various 
dimensions.
155
  
For the case at bar, it was the right to informational self-determination that 
came into play. That right protects an individual’s choice to decide when and within 
which limits his or her personal life circumstances are revealed, particularly in the age 
of data processing.
156
 Furthermore, the right’s scope is dependent on the spheres 
affected: the intimate, private or social.
157
 Corresponding to the discussion in Part 
II.B of this article,
158
 the first sphere warrants the highest degree of protection, as it 
concerns the inviolable core of the personal sphere (e.g., sexual orientation). The 
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second allows intrusions only if they are justifiable and proportionate, and the third 
merits the least protection because it concerns an individual’s social life.159 
In the Court’s opinion, the online platform had touched only upon the social 
sphere of the plaintiff because the rating concerned her professional performance and 
conduct as a teacher.
160
 It thus held that freedom of expression overrode her right to 
informational self-determination because teachers and other professionals must accept 
criticism or applause of their professional conduct, which is inevitably intertwined 
with social life.
161
 As the rating site related only to the plaintiff’s professional/social 
sphere, that is, did not touch upon her core private sphere, the right of personality had 
to give way to freedom of expression. In addition, the Court also highlighted that 
freedom of expression protects anonymous opinions because antipode would lead to 
self-censorship. It further pointed out that if the posts had been abusive or offensive or 
amounted to an attack on the teacher’s dignity, then its decision would have been 
different.
162
 Each case has to be decided on its own facts. However, it is worthwhile 
noting the features of spickmich.de that led the Court to conclude that the case 
constituted a reasonable exercise of freedom of expression: the site permitted only one 
registration per e-mail address; distribution was restricted to current students; log-in 
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and registration were required; users had to select a particular school and could rate 
and view ratings on teachers within that school alone; data were retained for no longer 
than one year; no comments were allowed; and ratings were not visible on search 
engines.
163
 
Subsequent litigation concerning rating sites has largely followed the 
principles set in the spickmich.de case: namely, a plaintiff is not entitled to know the 
identity of a poster after a website has removed derogatory comments,
164
 and doctors 
should expect to face “open criticism” in the form of online ratings.165 With regard to 
the issue of misleading ratings, which did not arise in the spickmich.de case, the 
German courts have been rather more skeptical and unsympathetic toward rating 
platforms. For instance, when the U.S. company Yelp! bought the German rating 
platform Qype in 2012, it changed its modes of both operation and rating.
166
 Similar 
to the practice noted in our earlier discussion of the U.S. lawsuits against Yelp!, after 
its purchase Qype started filtering out positive comments on many businesses while 
retaining negative comments, which resulted in the massive downgrading of many 
business entities. For example, in one case, the plaintiff ran a bridal dress shop that 
had previously received a five-out-of-five-star rating but suddenly found itself with a 
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mere two-star rating under the new system, leading to a significant drop in 
business.
167
 Accordingly, the shop brought an action for violation of its right of 
personality.
168
 The court ruled in the plaintiff’s favor, and held that although 
companies do not enjoy a right of personality as extensive as that enjoyed by a person, 
it was by no means clear that deleting the posts constituted an exercise of freedom of 
expression.
169
 Similarly, in another case the court condemned the rating portal 
Jameda when it heard that its top-rated doctors list was “manipulated by purchase.”170 
It ordered that Jameda must either cease the practice of posting such misleading 
comments about doctors or state clearly that the list was an advertisement.
171
 This 
jurisprudence of the BGH shows the two main issues of online rating: the lack of 
transparency regarding the rating criteria and the conflict between free speech and 
right to self-determination.  
 
III. Searching for Alternatives 
In juxtaposing the U.S. and German legal approaches to the regulation and 
protection of reputation on online rating platforms, we have learnt about the potential 
and power of reputational sanctions. U.S. judicial decisions, as demonstrated by the 
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cases discussed herein, exhibit lopsided favoritism toward online free speech despite 
some rating sites posting blatantly inaccurate information and only one-sided negative 
reviews, leaving victims with few remedies other than paying online reputation 
companies to rebuild their reputations. The U.S. approach thus supports an 
unsatisfactory situation in which individuals have very little control over their 
reputations, which are thus left in the hands of others. The German courts, in contrast, 
have adopted a more nuanced approach in which the evaluation of and opinions on an 
individual are treated as belonging to the constitutionally protected right of 
personality. The German Constitutional Court has recognized that personal comments 
can in certain situations intrude into the personal sphere, and have also engaged in 
careful scrutiny of the various zones of the that sphere, with the most intimate private 
sphere prized as inviolable. In the cases considered above, the courts carefully 
balanced the personal and social spheres and the right of personality (right to 
informational self-determination) and right to freedom of expression. What the 
German courts have thus far failed to do is to address the overlap between the private 
and social spheres. Evaluations of professional performance often touch upon 
personal characteristics and abilities such as a sense of humor. In the spickmich.de 
case, it was revealed that the rating portal had previously included a category allowing 
student users to consider whether a teacher was sexy, but that category was removed 
 36 
during the course of litigation.
172
 In post-spickmich judicial decisions, the German 
courts have endeavored to devise a fair system of online reputation rating, with 
distinctions drawn between different rating subjects (businesses or persons), different 
rating criteria and different access systems. In a recent case a German district court 
also acknowledged a violation of the social sphere when information about 
bankruptcy was revealed without consent and against the will of the concerned 
individual.
173
 It therefore does not need to be a violation of the most private sphere to 
affect somebody’s right to self-determination. 
Neither the U.S. nor German legal systems really takes into account the actual 
practices and informal norms of online platform users. However, by focusing on the 
platforms themselves and their liability, the law in both has indirectly influenced the 
way in which providers design the context of user interactions. Hence, providers have 
become intermediaries, moderating the relationship between informal social norms 
and formal law, although it remains unclear what that means for conflict resolution 
and behavior coordination on rating platforms.  
The cases discussed herein suggest that the major causes of frustration for 
plaintiffs are the lack of transparency concerning evaluation criteria and the 
unavailability of any means of response (including a right to reply, request a 
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correction and demand a retraction). Hence, effective disclosure requirements and an 
opportunity to present the other side of the story are essential to ensuring the fairness 
and accuracy of online reputation systems. Frank Pasquale advocates the mandatory 
disclosure of ranking data and methodologies to tackle the problem of “black-box” 
evaluation systems.
174
   
In addition, it is also important that online evaluation sites that affect people’s 
professional reputation comply with the additional requirement to delete inaccurate 
information and bar decontextualized ratings. As previously noted, reputation as 
property has a special market value attached that can affect a person’s livelihood. It is 
thus necessary for such sites to provide a correction mechanism or a right to reply. In 
clear cases of erroneous information (as in the case of Davis v. Avvo
175
), a mechanism 
should be in place to allow corrections when objective information can be easily 
established.  
A trickier issue is how to decide when, whether and how to include an 
alternative story. In Part II, we discuss cases in which evaluation sites had filtered out 
positive consumer comments while retaining negative ones, an understandably 
frustrating and seemingly unfair situation for the targeted individuals. Concerned 
platforms should thus allow individuals to exercise a right of response to defend 
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themselves. For example, in the online platform ratemyprofessors.com, students can 
rate their professors and post comments. At the same time, however, professors can 
also “strike back” and offer their own views of their teaching.176 
What we are emphasizing is the need to arrive at a standard that is fair to 
platform providers, users and evaluation targets. At the state level, U.S. insurance 
companies have agreed to follow specific guidelines on ranking doctors based on a 
national model established by the federal government.
177
 At the private level, 
attempts to set guidelines may involve a complex interaction of social norms, as seen 
in disputes concerning Wikipedia-related reputation issues.
178
 Although Wikipedia is 
not an evaluation site, the user-generated online encyclopedia provides a standard 
procedure for complainants looking to protect their reputation,
179
 and applies a more 
stringent standard for biographies of living persons.
180
 Information on a living person 
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that is unsourced, poorly sourced or contentious must be removed immediately.
181
 In 
addition, every article on Wikipedia has a “talk” page that allows users to post 
comments on or concerns about the article.
182
 Furthermore, administrators can also 
block an article, require that additional revisions be flagged or ban a user,
183
 although 
offended users are accorded a right of appeal.
184
 In sum, Wikipedia’s posting policy 
and dispute-handling mechanism adhere to the principles of transparency and the 
rights of response and appeal, and address the needs and concerns of both users and 
subjects.   
Ultimately, what we need are different sets of etiquette for different rating 
systems because the public interest at risk in the external social and internal private 
spheres is markedly different. The implementation of such sets would not only benefit 
the individuals scored or evaluated, but also the users of reputation and evaluation 
platforms and, ultimately, society as a whole. Recalling our earlier discussion of Post, 
reputation is by nature social, public and relational.
185
 Evaluation sites thus need to 
fulfill the social role of assigning fair value to reputation and sending an accurate 
signal to the community if they want to be reliable and meaningful to consumers. 
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Conclusion 
 
Reputation is a mysterious
186
 and powerful thing. It is intensely personal and innately 
social at the same time. It concerns one’s own identity, yet is also intertwined with 
social appraisal in the minds of others. Regardless of how carefully we groom and 
shape our reputations, the final judgment rests in the hands of others. Like it or not, in 
today’s networked community, we have become objects vulnerable to having various 
aspects of our lives ranked, scored, evaluated and commented upon by anonymous 
others. U.S. defamation law seems inadequate to protect individuals against the 
ratings and comments of an unknown crowd. German law on the right to personality 
has developed a taxonomy of spheres to protect the personal and situate it in relation 
to the social. Although U.S. and German laws protect different aspects of reputation, 
they have generally achieved the same effect in restricting the flow of information on 
individuals and preventing harm to their social status and private lives. However, the 
reputation sphere is expanding rapidly in the online world,
187
 bringing new 
challenges to individuals, users, platform operators and society as a whole. 
Although different legal rights have been identified and fought for, the 
reputation interest remains the same. What has yet to be addressed is the issue of how 
to develop a new procedural layout that can accommodate social norms, technological 
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advancement and the legal right to protect reputation on online platform. In this article, 
we have identified the personal rights and interests involved in reputation, the societal 
interests in freedom of expression and the necessity of establishing a reliable system 
for assessing reputation, particularly in the professional context. Rather than leave 
individuals to seek help from private corporations in attempting to rescue and manage 
their reputations, our legal systems should require evaluation platforms to comply 
with a set of minimum procedural standards of fairness. What is particularly required 
for online ranking and rating sites is a set of transparency rules that inform users of 
the assessment criteria, as well as a system offering aggrieved individuals a right to 
reply. The latter should incorporate rights to respond, to openly rebut allegations, to 
correct information and to request the retraction of information. As evaluation 
platforms are gaining in popularity and shaping public communication, we need a 
new set of policies and practices to regulate the online ecology and protect reputation. 
Only then can we interact and participate meaningfully in constructing our own and 
others’ reputations. 
 
 
